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b. Due to the shortage of PCS funds and DA reassignment restrictions, USASAFSA offered curtailment or extension options to those personnel scheduled for discharge or separation prior to 31 March 1976. Many chose curtailment, and some of those requested European separations. Identities of those to be separated in USAREUR have not been determined, pending approval of the requests.

c. Eight dismantled vans remain at the target and the Seventh Army Training Center (SATC) Engineer Office, Grafenwoehr (QA0911) has announced bids for their removal or destruction. The vans represent a total present value of \$40,000 to the US Government and Property Disposal officials are reluctant to destroy the vans as they have a high resale value in Europe. It is expected that in the near future a contractor will have personnel at the target, either removing or dismantling the vans.

d. All of the IA FAIRE VITE (LFV) personnel have arrived at the target. The NCOIC is SFC [b6] All team members are assigned to the Supply and Maintenance Company (SMC), Support Battalion, USASAFSA. [b6] is a Cryptographic Equipment Repair Supervisor (MOS 32G), has over 13 years service with USASA, is married (no children) and resides with his wife, [b6] nee: [b6] US citizen, at [b6] [b6] is 35 years old, a native of Colorado and expects to remain at the target until his normal DEROS in November 1978. [b6] mother is a naturalized US citizen, born in Germany, her father is employed as a Systems Engineer at American Forces Network (AFN), Frankfurt (MA7749). [b6] appears to be highly proficient and has exhibited a positive attitude toward his assignment. PLO contacts to date have indicated Helus will be cooperative and receptive to MI support and contact. On the most recent visit to the target (15 January 1976), [b6] was reportedly on TDY attending an unidentified training course at USASAFSA. He is scheduled to return to the target by mid-February 1976.

e. Other members of the LFV team are identified as follows:

- (1) SP5 Terry P. Pack, [b6], DEROS February 1978
- (2) SP5 [b6] DEROS/ETS April 1978
- (3) SP4 [b6] DEROS/ETS February 1977
- (4) SP4 [b6] DEROS/ETS April 1978
- (5) SP4 [b6] DEROS/ETS April 1978
- (6) SP4 [b6]

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f. The team began on-site training on 13 December 1975. All of the personnel in paragraph 3e above, are Intercept Receiving System Repairmen (MOS 33C) or Intercept Recording System Repairmen (MOS 33D). All are single or unaccompanied; none admitted to having any girl friends living in the target area, or any that they intended to have move into the area. In general, the LFV team members appear to be security conscious. They have been at the target long enough to become familiar with some of the USASA "haunts" (Hoherbogen Restaurant in Rimbach (UQ4553) and the Ratskeller and Ambergerhof Restaurants in Furth-im-Wald (UQ4364)), and have been eager to acquire information on places of intelligence interest or with a bad reputation.

g. The target has a German shepard dog, "Sam" which is partially attack-trained and does not react well to strangers, females and blond males (SP5 Pack has particular difficulty in getting close to the dog). "Sam" reportedly was beaten and generally mistreated by previous owners, and his attack training has given him just enough knowledge to be dangerous.

h. Electrical power at the target will continue to be provided by the Pilsen Power Grid. Once activated, the site will have a 22 Kilovolt self-regulating generator with a 14-day gasoline supply for backup/emergency use. Water must be trucked to the site and sewage removed from a holding tank. Both water and sewage tanks are planned for 14-day capacity. A German firm, as yet unidentified, from Brueck (UQ0458) has contracted to service the holding tank and to truck in water from the Rimbach public water works. Emergency fire service will be provided by the Neukirchen-Heilig Blut (UQ5258) Volunteer Fire Department, 15 kilometers away, with an unknown reaction time. Medical assistance will be provided by the German civilian hospital in Koetzting (UQ4349); air evacuation by helicopter is possible through the MEDIVAC capability at SATC, Grafenwoehr. APO mail will be addressed to Post Office boxes at USASAFSA, will be re-packaged and sent through German mail channels to: Remote Site LFV, SFC [b6] 8491 Rimbach. [b6] will pick up mail daily from the Rimbach post office.

i. The site will have three communications channels:

- (1) Direct AUTOSEVOCOM to USASAFSA Control Center
- (2) Non-Secure "order wire" to USASAFSA Control Center
- (3) German commercial phone (Class B) (09947-302) through the Neukirchen-Heilig Blut exchange.

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j. Target personnel will live in the "Chateau" located adjacent to the Operations Building. The newly constructed "Chateau" consists of a common area: living room, kitchen and recreation facilities, with couches, television, stereo and a pool table; and adjacent sleeping quarters. Personnel will be allowed guests in the common area. The Commander, SMC has advised [b6] he may hire a local cook if the team members agree. [b6] would like to hire his wife for this activity, as she will otherwise be unemployed. This solution appears to have a distinct advantage over hiring a local area national.

k. Two team members will be on duty at the site, 24 hours a day. Present plans call for the issue of .45 caliber pistols and ammunition, but it has not yet been determined where the weapons and ammunition will be stored. In the event of attempted penetrations of the area, personnel have been instructed to lock all entrances and remain inside the building. [b6] has been advised that elements of the 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR) at Camp May, Regen (UQ6326), 43 kilometers, may have a reaction capability, reaction time unknown. 2ACR elements patrol the CSSR border area near the site and may be capable of a short reaction time. Joint defense plans have been discussed with two other military units in the same immediate area, Fernmeldesektor F of the FRG Armed Forces and Detachment D of the French Forces. Both counterparts appeared eager to form joint defense plans, but the non-NATO status of the French precluded USASA from negotiating at the local level. The problem reportedly was identified to USASAFSA. Each member of the team will have one key to the entrance gate which will be kept locked at all times after the German contractor personnel have departed the site. The operations building, a SI-area, is equipped with heat and sound-sensitive alarm systems and alarms also sound in the event of power loss or equipment malfunction. The German contractor engaged in construction work at the site will remove approximately 1.5 meters of rock from the end of the ridge near the tower to enlarge the antenna scanning area. This work cannot be completed during the winter months and is expected to be finished by May 1976. Explosives cannot be used due to the sensitivity of installed equipment in the immediate area.

l. On 15 January 1976, the PLO met the LFV Project Officer from the USASA Systems Agency, Vint Hill Farms, Warrenton, Virginia, who was visiting the target. He explained that the following relay towers in the LFV system are unmanned by USASA personnel:

Seibersdorf	TQ97624600
Landshut	TP94688240
Bonstetten	PU26906739
Dachau	PU80735466
Wasserkuppe*	NA66489456
Wildflecken*	NA56258478
Brandhof**	PV26258873

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Heidenheim** PV28953095
Schwanberg** NA91890879

*Army location occupied by non-USASA personnel

** USAF installation

The present SOP gives little information on the remote towers as far as security is concerned. In general, the remote towers are tall antennas with small buildings at the base. Each building has a door that is supposed to be kept locked. If someone enters one of the buildings an alarm light goes on in the central control area at USASAFSA. Telephones with open speakers are located in each building, so that if the alarm lights go on in the central area, duty personnel can pick up a phone and ask who is there. Arrangements have reportedly been made with local police, details unknown, to keep a close watch on all the remote towers, but the Project Officer was unaware what action the police were to take concerning trespassers. Anyone gaining access to the building at a remote tower could, with the proper equipment, tap the open service line and the scrambled traffic lines. While tapping the traffic lines would yield nothing but meaningless letter/number groups, they might have some value to a Hostile Intelligence Service. The isolation of several of the remote towers makes them susceptible to sabotage as the loss of a tower in the relay system renders that segment of the system useless.

4. ~~(S)~~ Operational Matters:

a. Reference paragraph 3j, above: USASA has not planned any electronic sweep of the SI area or the common room now that the German contractor has completed installation of the wiring. [b6] asked if the PLO could arrange for an electronic sweep of the entire area as future visitors may want to use the common area for conferences. The PLO was non-committal and no action will be taken unless a formal request is received.

b. Reference paragraph 4g of reference c: On 8 December 1975, the First Sergeant of Company B advised that SP5 [b6] was no longer interested in ACGP-97 duties and that his application papers should be destroyed. SP4 [b6] the other individual interested in ACGP-97 will remain at the target until February 1976 and his application is being processed with PLO assistance.

c. Reference paragraph 4e, reference c: [b6] is moving to Augsburg on about 1 February 1976 and will be operating the Cafe-Restaurant "Sonne", 9 Hauptstrasse, Augsburg-Bergheim (PU3554), telephone: 97524. [b6] has passed out the name and address of his new establishment to target

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personnel who are moving to Augsburg, and he has been actively soliciting their future patronage. There have been no indications that [b6] has attempted to elicit information from target personnel, however his proximity to the target and the regular customers from the target at his establishment, the Hoherbogen Restaurant, have resulted in him being well-informed about ongoing transfers, the drawdown and future operations in the target area. All members of the LFV team are aware of MI interest in [b6]. It is expected that the Hoherbogen Restaurant will be leased by another party and remain open. No information is presently available on the new lessee.

d. Reference paragraphs 4f and 4j, reference c, the information provided is clarified as follows: SP4 [b6] formerly attached to the target from the 502d ASA Group, contacted the Army Chaplain at the Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) for spiritual guidance when she became depressed after developing a strong emotional attachment to another female soldier who had departed the target. [b6] was counselled and subsequently reassigned to USASAFSA. [b6] had nothing to do with the "satanic religious practices" referenced in paragraph 4f, reference c. That matter was not known to involve any target personnel and all personnel known to be involved with alleged "satanic religious practices" are assigned or attached to the 207th ASA Company, HTA and discussion of the incident is not germane to this report.

e. Reference paragraph 4k, reference c; SP4 [b6], due to be transferred to USASAFSA is considered by his supervisors to be a potential troublemaker in the organization. He has been behaving strangely, which may be attributable to injuries he received in a 1974 motorcycle accident. [b6] was reprimanded by the Company B Commander for signing a guard property receipt with the name "Mickey F--King Mouse." He has also been involved in a questionable transaction with a German national involving a motorcycle.

f. Target personnel reported no SMLM activity in the area since approximately September 1975. The PLO will recommend that the nearby German Army unit advise target personnel whenever a SMLM vehicle is reported in the area. It is known that German Military Counterintelligence (MAD) advises Fernmeldesektor F whenever a SMLM vehicle is reported in the area. The PLO will provide assistance to the LFV team in formulating a SMLM SOP. One team member had no SMLM card and none of the team members contacted on 15 January 1976 were certain of what action to take if a SMLM vehicle was sighted in the target area. None of those individuals could recall having received a meaningful SMLM briefing since arriving in USAREUR.

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g. The PLO gave a short SAEDA briefing to LFV team members (less b6) on 15 January 1976 and requested their cooperation in identifying risk spots, suspicious incidents, undue curiosity and other SAEDA-related matters.

h. In October or November 1975, date unknown, an individual was sighted measuring the perimeter fence of the target from the outside. He was challenged and he rapidly retreated into the wooded area and could not be located. The incident was allegedly reported to USASAFSA and it was later concluded that the individual probably was a Bundespost (German Post Office) employee, since a Bundespost truck had been seen near the site that day, and the matter was considered settled. The incident was not reported to MI when it occurred, and only became known on 15 January 1976 during casual conversation. It was emphasized to LFV team members that available MI support can only be effective if all incidents, however minor, are reported in a timely manner. In the above instance, it was not determined how the unidentified individual was concluded to be a Post Office employee, but in any event, it appeared from information available that the activities as described were suspicious and warranted further investigation.

i. On 16 November 1975, two ranking representatives of the CSSR firm SEMEX, a subsidiary of the state-owned auto manufacturing firm SKODA visited the SEMEX offices in Furth-im-Wald concerning a planned program to import CSSR tractors into the FRG via SEMEX. Despite the fact that their business was in Furth-im-Wald and there was an abundance of hotel rooms in that town, the two individuals made reservations at the Hotel Kolmerhof in Rimbach for the night of 16-17 November. They departed for Munich (PU9135), FRG the following day. Nothing of a suspicious nature was noted during the visit, but representatives from SEMEX have been identified in the past engaged in low-level intelligence activity on behalf of the CSSR Intelligence Service. On 25 November 1975, inquiries at the target revealed that no unit personnel regularly patronized the Kolmerhof Hotel, although it was located directly across the street from the Company B administrative area, because of its higher prices and it catered to a clientele able to spend more money than most target members. On occasion, the hotel did hold dances and some target personnel had been known to attend.

j. On 13 December 1975, SSG [b6] Company B, was reported as missing after spending an evening drinking at a tavern in Voggendorf (UQ4453). Unit personnel, assisted by local police, searched the area thoroughly and he was finally found the following day after having reportedly spend the night in the quarters of a female member of the unit. The incident was reported to MI by the target in a timely manner and close coordination was maintained with unit supervisory personnel, Military Police, and the local police during the search action.

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5. *(C)* Source Activity:

a. B58,786 advised that the behavior of [b6] (paragraph 4e, above) had deteriorated, possibly due to physical problems arising from his 1974 motorcycle accident. In the accident, [b6] was gored by a wire fence and his neck was heavily scarred despite several plastic surgery operations. Some spinal damage also occurred and [b6] was on medication and frequently complained of headaches. He could not concentrate, argued with supervisors and had developed a short attention span. Lead questioned [b6] suitability for continued assignment to sensitive duties.

b. B58,786 was encouraged to patronize the Hoberbogen Restaurant more often, in order to maintain continuity to the limited investigation, pending [b6] intended move to Augsburg. Lead was to determine if [b6] acted in a suspicious manner. This activity was designed to assist in the assessment of the Lead's potential. This action was not out of character as Lead patronized the restaurant occasionally and knows [b6]. Lead was not targetted against [b6] nor was MI committed to reimburse Lead for any expenses incurred.

c. Local agency and 201 file checks on LFV team members are being submitted as a separate action. Name traces will be conducted on all team members.

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6. *(C)* Comments:

a. No support is required from Special Operations Detachment, except for a portion of the actions outlined in paragraph 5c, above (to be submitted).

b. Reference paragraph 3b, above, if members of Company B obtain European separations, whether or not they remain in the target area, they could pose a similar situation to that which occurred in July 1974 when a former member of Company B, who had a post-separation travel restriction, travelled to CSSR within a few days after his European separation. The PLO will arrange with Commander, Company B for SAEDA briefings and appropriate warnings on travel restrictions to all target personnel receiving European separations.

c. Reference paragraph 3 1 above, local police having jurisdiction over the areas of the LFV remote towers within the 511th MI Battalion area will be contacted to determine what they have been told about the towers and what measures they are taking pertaining to tower security.

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d. That portion of the comments in paragraph 6c, reference c that pertain to the possible limited results of this operation after target automation, remain valid. Considering these limitations, the thrust of the operation will be directed at developing threat information directed against the target and target personnel.

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